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We propose a flexible stochastic framework for modeling the market share dynamics over time
in a multiple markets setting, where firms interact within and between markets. Firms undergo
stochastic idiosyncratic shocks, which contract their shares, and compete to consolidate their
position by acquiring new ones in both the market where they operate and in new markets.
The model parameters can meaningfully account for phenomena such as barriers to entry and
exit, fixed and sunk costs, costs of expanding to new sectors with different technologies and
competitive advantage among firms. The construction is obtained in a Bayesian framework by
means of a collection of nonparametric hierarchical mixtures, which induce the dependence
between markets and provide a generalization of the Blackwell–MacQueen Po´lya urn scheme,
which in turn is used to generate a partially exchangeable dynamical particle system. A Markov
Chain Monte Carlo algorithm is provided for simulating trajectories of the system, by means of
which we perform a simulation study for transitions to different economic regimes. Moreover, it
is shown that the infinite-dimensional properties of the system, when appropriately transformed
and rescaled, are those of a collection of interacting Fleming–Viot diffusions.
Keywords: Bayesian nonparametrics; Gibbs sampler; interacting Fleming–Viot processes;
interacting Po`lya urns; market dynamics; particle system; species sampling models
1. Introduction
The idea of explaining firm dynamics by means of a stochastic model for the market evolu-
tion has been present in the literature for a long time. However, only recently, firm-specific
stochastic elements have been introduced to generate the dynamics. Jovanovic [26] was
the first to formulate an equilibrium model where stochastic shocks are drawn from a
distribution with known variance and firm-specific mean, thus determining selection of
the most efficient. Later Ericson and Pakes [12] provide a stochastic model for industry
behavior which allows for heterogeneity and idiosyncratic shocks, where firms invest and
the stochastic outcome determines the firm’s success, thus accounting for a selection pro-
cess which can lead to the firm’s exit from the market. Hopenhayn [24] performs steady
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state analysis of a dynamic stochastic model which allows for entry, exit and hetero-
geneity. In [38] a stochastic model for market share dynamics, based on simple random
walks, is introduced. The common feature of this non-exhaustive list is that, despite the
mentioned models being inter-temporal and stochastic, the analysis and the explicit de-
scription of the model dynamics are essentially done at equilibrium, thus projecting the
whole construction onto a static dimension and accounting for time somehow implicitly.
Indeed, the researcher usually finds herself before the choice between a dynamic model
with a representative agent and a steady-state analysis of an equilibrium model with
heterogeneity. Furthermore, relevant for our discussion are two technical difficulties with
reference to devising stochastic models for market share dynamics: the interdependence
of market shares, and the fact that the distribution of the size of shocks to each firm’s
share is likely to depend on that firm’s current share. As stated in [38], these together
imply that an appropriate model might be one in which the distribution of shocks to
each firm’s share is conditioned on the full vector of market shares in the current period.
The urge to overcome these problems from an aggregate perspective, while retaining the
micro dynamics, has lead to a recent tendency of borrowing ideas from statistical physics
for modeling certain problems in economics and finance. A particularly useful example
of these tools is given by interacting particle systems, which are arbitrary-dimensional
models describing the dynamic interaction of several variables (or particles). These allow
for heterogeneity and idiosyncratic stochastic features but still permit a relatively easy
investigation of the aggregate system properties. In other words, the macroscopic behav-
ior of the system is derived from the microscopic random interactions of the economic
agents, and these techniques allow us to keep track of the whole tree of outcomes in an
inter-temporal framework. A recent example of such an approach is given in [5], where
interacting particle systems are used to model the propagation of financial distress in a
network of firms. Another example is [36], which studies limit theorems for the process
of empirical measures of an economic model driven by a large system of agents that in-
teract locally by means of mechanisms similar to what, in population genetics, are called
mutation and recombination.
Here we propose a Bayesian nonparametric approach for modeling market share dy-
namics by constructing a stochastic model with interacting particles which allows us
to overcome the above mentioned technical difficulties. In particular, a nonparametric
approach allows us to avoid any unnecessary assumption on the distributional form of
the involved quantities, while a Bayesian approach naturally incorporates probabilistic
clustering of objects and features conditional predictive structures, easily admitting the
representation of agents’ interactions based on the current individual status. Thus, with
respect to the literature on market share dynamics, we model time explicitly, instead
of analyzing the system at equilibrium, while retaining heterogeneity and conditioning
on the full vector of market shares. And despite the different scope, with respect to the
particles approach in [36], we instead consider many subsystems with interactions among
each other and thus obtain a vector of dependent continuous-time processes. In con-
structing the model, the emphasis will be on generality and flexibility, which necessarily
implies a certain degree of stylization of the dynamics. However, this allows the model
to be easily adapted to represent diverse applied frameworks, such as, for example, pop-
ulation genetics, by appropriately specifying the corresponding relevant parameters. As
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a matter of fact, we will follow the market share motivation throughout the paper, with
the parallel intent of favoring intuition behind the stochastic mechanisms. A completely
micro-founded economic application will be provided in a follow-up paper [32]. However,
besides the construction, the present paper includes an asymptotic distributional result
which shows weak convergence of the aggregate system to a collection of dependent
diffusion processes. This is a result of independent mathematical interest, relevant, in
particular, for the population genetics literature, where our construction can be seen as
a countable approximation of a system of Fleming–Viot diffusions with mutation, selec-
tion and migration (see [6]). Appendix A includes some basic material on Fleming–Viot
processes.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our approach is also allied to recent developments
in the Bayesian nonparametric literature: although structurally different, our model has
a natural interpretation within this field as belonging to the class of dependent processes,
an important line of research initiated in the seminal papers of [30, 31]. Among others,
we mention interesting dependent models developed in [9–11, 35, 39] where one can
find applications to epidemiology, survival analysis and functional data analysis. See the
monograph [23] for a recent review of the discipline. Although powerful and flexible,
Bayesian nonparametric methods have not yet been extensively exploited for economic
applications. Among the contributions to date, we mention [22, 27, 33] for financial time
series, [19, 21] for volatility estimation, [28] for option pricing and [3, 8] for discrete
choice models, [20] for stochastic frontier models. With respect to this literature, the
proposed construction can be seen as a dynamic partially exchangeable array, so that
the dependence is meant both with respect to time and in terms of a vector of random
probability measures.
To be more specific, we introduce a flexible stochastic model for describing the time
dynamics of the market concentration in several interacting, self-regulated markets. A po-
tentially infinite number of companies operate in those markets where they have a positive
share. Firms can enter and exit a market, and expand or contract their share in competi-
tion with other firms by means of endogenous stochastic idiosyncratic shocks. The model
parameters allow for barriers to entry and exit, costs of expansion in new markets (e.g.,
technology conversion costs), sunk costs and different mechanisms of competitive advan-
tage. The construction is achieved by first defining an appropriate collection of dependent
nonparametric hierarchical models and deriving a related system of interacting general-
ized Po`lya urn schemes. This underlying Bayesian framework is detailed in Section 2.
The collection of hierarchies induces the dependence between markets and allows us to
construct, in Section 3, a dynamic system, which is driven by means of Gibbs sampling
techniques [18] and describes how companies interact among one another within and be-
tween markets over time. These undergo stochastic idiosyncratic shocks that lower their
current share and compete to increment it. An appropriate set of parameters regulates
the mechanisms through which firms acquire and lose shares and determines the compet-
itive selection in terms of relative strengths as functions of their current position in the
market and, possibly, the current market configuration as a whole. For example, shocks
can be set to be random in general but deterministic when a firm crosses upwards some
fixed threshold, meaning that some antitrust authority has fixed an upper bound on the
4 I. Pru¨nster and M. Ruggiero
market percentage which can be controlled by a single firm, which is thus forced away
from the dominant position. The competitive advantage allows for a great degree of flexi-
bility, involving a functional form with very weak assumptions. In Section 4 the dynamic
system is then mapped into a measure-valued process, which pools together the local in-
formation and describes the evolution of the aggregate markets. The system is then shown
to converge in distribution, under certain conditions and after appropriate rescaling, to
a system of dependent diffusion processes, each with values in the space of probability
measures, known as interacting Fleming–Viot diffusions. In Section 5 two algorithms
which generate sample paths of the system are presented, corresponding to competitive
advantage directly or implicitly modeled. A simulation study is then performed to explore
dynamically different economic scenarios with several choices of the model parameters,
investigating the effects of changes in the market characteristics on the economic dynam-
ics. Particular attention is devoted to transitions of economic regimes as dependent on
specific features of the market, on regulations imposed by the policy maker or on the
interaction with other markets with different structural properties. Finally, Appendix A
briefly recalls some background material on Gibbs sampling, Fleming–Viot processes and
interacting Fleming–Viot processes, while all proofs are deferred to Appendix B.
2. The underlying framework
In this section we define a collection of dependent nonparametric hierarchical models,
which will allow a dynamic representation of the market’s interaction.
Let α be a finite non-null measure on a complete and separable space X endowed with
its Borel sigma algebra X , and consider the Po`lya urn for a continuum of colors, which
represents a fundamental tool in many constructions of Bayesian nonparametric models.
This is such that X1 ∼ α(·)/α(X), and, for n≥ 2,
Xn|X1, . . . ,Xn−1 ∼
α(·) +
∑n−1
i=1 δXk(·)
α(X) + n− 1
, (1)
where δy denotes a point mass at y. We will denote the joint law of a sequence
(X1, . . . ,Xn) from (1) with M
α
n , so that
Mαn =
α
α(X)
n∏
i=2
α+
∑
k<i δXk
α(X) + i− 1
. (2)
In [2] it is shown that this prediction scheme is closely related to the Dirichlet process
prior, introduced by [16]. A random probability measure P on (X,X ) is said to be a
Dirichlet process with parameter measure α, henceforth denoted P ∼D(·|α), if for every
k ≥ 1 and every measurable partition B1, . . . ,Bk of X, the vector (P (B1), . . . , P (Bk)) has
Dirichlet distribution with parameters (α(B1), . . . , α(Bk)).
Among the various generalizations of the Po`lya urn scheme (1) present in the literature,
a recent extension given in [37] will be particularly useful for our construction. Consider,
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for every n≥ 1, the joint distribution
qn(dx1, . . . ,dxn)∝ pn(dx1, . . . ,dxn)
n∏
k=1
βn(xk), (3)
where βn is a given bounded measurable function on X. A representation for (3) can
be provided in terms of a Dirichlet process mixture model [29]. In particular, it can be
easily seen that when pn ≡M
α
n in (3), the predictive distribution for Xi, given x(−i) =
(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn), is
qn,i(dxi|x(−i))∝ βn(xi)α(dxi) +
n∑
k 6=i
βn(xi)δxk(dxi). (4)
This can be thought of as a weighted version of (1), which is recovered when βn ≡ 1 for
all n≥ 1. A more general version of (4) can be obtained by making βn depend on the
whole vector and thus allowing for a broad range of interpretations. See the discussion
following (18) for this and for a more detailed interpretation of (4) in the context of the
present paper.
Consider now the following setting. For each n, let (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ X
n be an n-sized
sample from Mαn , and let
αx1,...,xn(dy) = α(dy) +
n∑
k=1
δxk(dy). (5)
Define the double hierarchy
X1, . . . ,Xn|P
i.i.d.
∼ P, P ∼D(·|α),
(6)
Y1, . . . , Yn|Qn
i.i.d.
∼ Qn, Qn ∼D(·|αx1,...,xn).
Here (X1, . . . ,Xn) are drawn from a Dirichlet process P ∼D(·|α) and (Y1, . . . , Yn), given
(X1, . . . ,Xn), are drawn from a Dirichlet process Qn :=Q|(X1, . . . ,Xn)∼D(·|αX1,...,Xn).
It can be easily seen that the joint law of (Y1, . . . , Yn) conditional on (X1, . . . ,Xn) is
M
αx1,...,xn
n , with Mαn as in (2). The following result, stated here for ease of reference,
can be found in [41].
Lemma 2.1. Let Mαn be as in (2). Then∫
Xn
M
αx1,...,xn
n (dy1, . . . ,dyn)M
α
n(dx1, . . . ,dxn) =M
α
n(dy1, . . . ,dyn). (7)
In particular, Lemma 2.1 yields a certain symmetry in (6), so that we could also
state that the joint law of (X1, . . . ,Xn) conditional on (Y1, . . . , Yn) is M
αy1,...,yn
n
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x= (x1, . . . , xn) and extend (3) to
qn(dx)∝ pn(dx)
n∏
k=1
βn(xk), qn(dy)∝ pn(dy)
n∏
k=1
βn(yk).
From (4), when (X1, . . . ,Xn) and (Y1, . . . , Yn) come from (6) we have for 1≤ i≤ n
q2n,i(dxi|x(−i),y)∝ βn(xi)αy1,...,yn(dxi) +
n∑
k 6=i
βn(xk)δxk(dxi) (8)
and similarly for yi. It is now straightforward to iterate the above argument and allow
for an arbitrary number of dependent hierarchies. Denote xr = (xr1, . . . , x
r
n) and αxr =
αxr1,...,xrn , where r, r
′, r′′ belong to some finite index set I, whose cardinality is denoted
#I. Then, for every n≥ 1, let
Xr|P
i.i.d.
∼ P, P ∼ D(·|α),
Xr|P r
i.i.d.
∼ P r, P r ∼ D(·|αxr),
Xr
′′
|P r
′,r′′ i.i.d.∼ P r
′,r′′ , P r
′,r′′ ∼ D(·|α
x
r,xr
′ ),
...
...
(9)
where the dimension subscript n has been suppressed in Xr,Xr
′
,Xr
′′
, . . . , for notational
simplicity. Denote now with
Dn = n ·#I (10)
the total number of components in (9). The joint law of the Dn items in (9) can be
written
Mαn(dx
r)Mαxrn (dx
r′)M
α
x
r,xr
′
n (dx
r′′) · · · , (11)
where, in view of Lemma 2.1, (11) is invariant with respect to the order of r, r′, r′′, . . . .
With a slight abuse of notation, define
I(−r) = {xr
′
: r′ ∈ I, r′ 6= r}, (12)
to be the set of all system components without the vector xr , and
I(−xri ) = {x
r′ : r′ ∈ I} \ {xri } (13)
to be the set of all system components without the item xri . Analogously to (8) in this
enlarged framework, the predictive law for xri , conditional on the rest of the system, can
be written
q
Dn,i
(dxri |I(−x
r
i ))∝ βn(x
r
i )αI(−r)(dx
r
i ) +
n∑
k 6=i
βn(x
r
k)δxrk(dx
r
i ), (14)
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where the interpretation of α
I(−r)
is clear from (5) and (12). Note that this predictive
law reduces to (1) when βn ≡ 1 and αI(−r) ≡ α. Expression (14) will be the key for
the definition of the market dynamics by means of an interacting system of particles.
A detailed interpretation for qDn,i will be provided in the following section. See (18) and
the following discussion.
To conclude the section, it is worth noting that (9) generates a partially exchangeable
array, where partial exchangeability is intended in the sense of de Finetti (see, e.g., [4]).
That is, if r, r′, r′′ identify rows, then the system components are row-wise exchangeable
but not exchangeable.
3. Dynamic models for market evolution
In this section we define a dynamical model for the temporal evolution of the firms’ market
shares in multiple interacting markets. The model can be regarded as a random element
whose realizations are right-continuous functions from [0,∞) to the space (XDn ,X Dn),
Dn ∈N being (10), and we refer to it as a particle system, since it explicitly models the
evolution of the share units, or particles, in several markets. For ease of presentation,
we approach the construction by first considering a single market for a fixed number n
of share units, and then extend it to a collection of markets. The investigation of the
asymptotic properties as n→∞ is, instead, the object of Section 4.
For any fixed n ≥ 1, consider a vector x = x(n) = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n, and let
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
Kn
) denote the Kn ≤ n distinct values in x, with x
∗
j having multiplicity nj .
The elements of (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
Kn
) represent the Kn firms operating in the market at a given
time. Here x∗j is a random label to be seen as a unique firm identifier. The vector x
represents the current market configuration, carrying implicitly the information on the
shares. Namely, the fraction of elements in x equal to x∗j is the market share possessed
by firm j. Here n represents the level of share fractionalization in the market. Dividing
the market into n fractions is not restrictive, since any share can be approximated by
means of a sufficiently large n. See Remark 5.1 below for a discussion of the implications
of this assumption on the computational costs.
Define now a Markov chain taking values in Xn as follows. At each step an index i
is chosen from {1, . . . , n} with probability γn,i ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, with
∑n
i=1 γn,i = 1.
Equivalently, let γj(nn) be the probability that firm x
∗
j loses an nth fraction of its
market share at a certain transition, where γj(nn) depends on the frequencies nn =
(n1, . . . , nKn). That is, firm x
∗
j undergoes a shock whose probability is idiosyncratic,
depending on the firm itself and on the current market configuration, summarized by
the vector of frequencies. Different choices of γj(nn) reflect different market regulations,
possibly imposed by the policy maker. We provide some examples:
(1) γj(nn) = 1/Kn: neutrality. All firms have equal probability of undergoing a shock;
(2) γj(nn) = nj/n: firms with higher shares are the weakest, with a flattening effect on
the share distribution. This parametrization is also useful in population genetics
contexts, where particles represent individuals;
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(3) γj(nn) = (1 − nj/n)/(Kn − 1) when Kn ≥ 2: firms with higher shares are the
strongest. The probability of losing shares is decreasing in the firms’ positions
in the market;
(4) γj(nn) = 1(maxi ni ≤ nC)γ˜j(nn)+1(nj > nC) for some constant 0<C < 1, where
1(A) is the indicator function of the event A. The probability of selecting x∗j is
γ˜j(nn) provided no firm controls more than C% of the market. If firm x
∗
j controls
more than C% of the market, at the following step, x∗j is selected with probability
one. Thus C is an upper bound imposed by the policy maker to avoid dominant
positions. Incidentally, there is a subtler aspect of this mechanism which is worth
commenting upon. It will be seen later that there is positive probability that
the same firm acquires the vacant share again, but this only results in picking
again x∗j with probability one, until the threshold C is crossed downwards. This
seemingly anomalous effect can be thought of as the viscosity with which a firm
in a dominant position gets back to a legitimate status when condemned by the
antitrust authority, which in no real world occurs instantaneously.
Suppose now xi = x
∗
j has been chosen in x. Once firm x
∗
j looses a fraction of its share,
the next state of the chain is obtained by sampling a new value for Xi from (4), leaving all
other components unchanged. Hence the ith fraction of share is reallocated, according to
the predictive distribution of Xi|x(−i), either to an existing firm or to a new one entering
the market.
Remark 3.1. The above Markov chain can also be thought of as generated by a Gibbs
sampler on qn(dx1, . . . ,dxn). This consists of sequentially updating one randomly selected
component at a time in (x1, . . . , xn) according to the component-specific full conditional
distribution qn,i(dxi|x(−i)). The Gibbs sampler is a special case of a Metropolis–Hastings
Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm, and, under some assumptions satisfied within the
above framework, yields a chain which is reversible with respect to qn(dx1, . . . ,dxn),
hence also stationary. See [18] for details and Appendix A for a brief account.
Consider now an arbitrary collection of markets, indexed by r, r′, r′′, . . . ∈ I, so that
the total size of the system is (10), and extend the construction as follows. At each
transition, a market r is selected at random with probability ̺r , and a component of
(xr1, . . . , x
r
n) is selected at random with probability γ
r
n,i. The next state is obtained by
setting all components of the system, different from xri , equal to their previous state, and
by sampling a new value for xri from (14). Choose now
α
I(−r)
(dy) = θπν0(dy) + θ(1− π)
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′)µr′(dy), (15)
where θ > 0, π ∈ [0,1], ν0 is a non-atomic probability measure on X,
µr′ = n
−1
n∑
i=1
δxr′
i
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and m(r, r′) :I × I → [0,1] is such that
m(r, r) = 0,
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′) = 1. (17)
In this case (14) becomes
q
Dn,i
(dxri |I(−x
r
i )) ∝ θπβn(x
r
i )ν0(dx
r
i )
(18)
+ θ(1− π)βn(x
r
i )
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′)µr′(dx
r
i ) +
n∑
k 6=i
βn(x
r
k)δxrk(dx
r
i )
with normalizing constant q¯
Dn,i
= O(n) when βn = 1 + O(n
−1). By inspection of (18),
there are three possible destinations for the allocation of the vacant share:
(i) A new firm is created and enters the market. The new value of the location xri is
sampled from ν0, which is non-atomic, so that x
r
i has (almost surely) never been
observed. Here ν0 is common to all markets. The possibility of choosing different
ν0,r, r ∈ I, is discussed in Section 5 below.
(ii) A firm operating in the same market r expands its share. The location is sampled
from the last term, which is a weighted empirical measure of the share distribution
in market r, obtained by ignoring the vacant share unit xri .
(iii) A firm operating in another market r′ either enters market r or expands its current
position in r. The location is sampled from the second term. In this case, an index
r′ 6= r is chosen according to the weightsm(r, ·); then within r′ a firm xr
′
j∗ is chosen
according to the weighted empirical measure
µr′(dy) = n
−1
n∑
k=1
βn(x
r′
k )δxr′
k
(dy).
If the cluster associated to xri has null frequency in the current state, we have an
entrance from r′; otherwise, we have a consolidation in r of a firm that operates,
at least, on both those markets.
We can now provide interpretation for the model parameters:
(a) θ governs barriers to entry: the lower the θ, the higher the barriers to entry, both
for entrance of new firms and for those operating in other markets.
(b) π regulates sunk costs : given θ, a low π makes expansions from other sectors more
likely than start-up of new firms, and vice versa.
(c) m(r, ·) allows us to set the costs of expanding to different sectors. For example,
it might represent costs of technology conversion a firm needs to sustain or some
regulation constraining its ability to operate in a certain market. Tuning m(·, ·) on
the base of some notion of distance between markets allows us to model these costs,
so that a low m(r, r′) implies, say, that r and r′ require very different technologies,
and vice versa.
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(d) βn is probably the most flexible parameter of the model, which, due to the minimal
assumptions on its functional form (see Section 2), can reflect different features of
the market, implying several possible interpretations. For example, it might repre-
sent competitive advantage. Since βn assigns different weights to different locations
of X, the higher βn(x
r
j∗ ), the more favored is x
r
j∗ when competing with the other
firms in the same market. Here, and later, xrj∗ denotes the jth firm in market r. It
is, however, to be noted that setting β ≡ 1 does not imply competitive neutrality
among firms, as the empirical measure implicitly favors those with higher shares.
More generally, observe that the model allows us to consider a weight function of
type βn(x
r
k, µr), where µr is the empirical measure of market r, making βn depend
on the whole current market configuration and on xrk explicitly. This indeed allows
for multiple interpretations and to arbitrarily set how firms relate to one another
when competing in the same market. For example, this more general parametriza-
tion allows us to model neutrality among firms by setting βn(x
r
k, µr) = 1/n
r
j , with
nrj being the number of share units possessed by firm j in market r.
(e) Weights γn,i can model barriers to exit, if appropriately tuned (see also points (1)
to (4) above). For example, setting γj(nn) very low (null) whenever nj , or nj/n, is
lower than a given threshold makes the exit of firm xrj∗ very unlikely (impossible).
The function βn, in point (d) above, will represent the crucial quantity which will
be used for introducing explicitly the micro-foundation of the model. However, we do
not pursue this here since we focus on generality and adaptability of the model. The
micro-foundation will be the object of a subsequent work.
4. Infinite dimensional properties
From a qualitative point of view the outlined discrete-time construction would be enough
for many applications. Indeed Section 5 below presents two algorithms which generate
realizations of the system and are used to perform a simulation study, based on the
above description. It is, however, convenient to embed the chain in continuous time,
which makes the investigation of its properties somewhat simpler and leads to a result
of independent mathematical interest. This will enable us to show that an appropriate
transformation of the continuous time chain converges in distribution to a well-known
class of processes which possess nice sample path properties. To this end, superimpose
the chain to a Poisson point process with intensity λn, which governs the waiting times
between points of discontinuity. The following proposition identifies the generator of the
resulting process under some specific assumptions which will be useful later. Recall that
the infinitesimal generator of a stochastic process {Z(t), t≥ 0} on a Banach space L is
the linear operator A defined by
Af = lim
t↓0
1
t
[E[f(Z(t))|Z(0)]− f(Z(0))]
with domain given by the subspace of all f ∈ L, for which the limit exists. In particular,
the infinitesimal generator carries all the essential information about the process, since
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it determines the finite-dimensional distributions. Before stating the result, we need to
introduce some notation. Let B(X) be the space of bounded measurable functions on X,
and (̺r)r∈I be a sequence with values in the corresponding simplex
∆#I =
{
(̺r)r∈I : ρr ≥ 0,∀r ∈ I,
∑
r∈I
̺r = 1
}
. (19)
Furthermore, let q
Dn,i
be as in (18), with q¯
Dn,i
its normalizing constant, and let
βn(z) = 1 + σ(z)/n, σ ∈B(X), (20)
Cn,r,i = λn̺rγ
r
n,i/q¯Dn,i . (21)
Define also the operators
ηi(x|z) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, z, xi+1, . . . , xn), (22)
Mng(w) =
∫
[g(y)− g(w)](1 + σ(y)/n)ν0(dy), g ∈B(X), (23)
Gn,r
′
g(w) =
∫
[g(y)− g(w)](1 + σ(y)/n)µr′(dy), g ∈B(X), (24)
and denote by
ηri , M
n
ri
f, Gn,r
′
ri
f (25)
such operators as applied to the ith coordinate of those in x which belong to r. For
instance, if y = (yr
′
1 , y
r
2, y
r
3, y
r′
4 ), where y2, y3 belong to market r and the others to r
′,
then ηr2(y|z) = η3(y|z) = (y
r′
1 , y
r
2, z, y
r′
4 ).
Proposition 4.1. Let X(Dn)(·) = {X(Dn)(t), t≥ 0} be the right-continuous process with
values in XDn which updates one component according to (18) at each point of a Pois-
son point process with intensity λn. Then X
(Dn)(·) has infinitesimal generator, for
f ∈B(XDn), given by
ADnf(x) =
∑
r∈I
{
θπ
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,iM
n
ri
f(x)
+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′
m(r, r′)
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,iG
n,r′
ri
f(x)
(26)
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,i[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)]
+
1
n
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,iσ(x
r
k)[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)]
}
.
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With respect to the market dynamics, generator (26) can be interpreted as follows. The
first term governs the creation of new firms, obtained by means of operator (23) which
updates with new values from ν0. The second regulates the entrance of firms from other
markets, via operator (24) and according to the “distance” kernel m(·, ·). The last two
terms deal with the expansion of firms in the same market. These parallel, respectively,
points (i), (iii) and (ii) above.
Consider now the probability-measure-valued system associated with X(Dn)(·), that
is, Y (n)(·) = {Y (n)(t), t≥ 0}, where
Y (n)(t) = (µr(t), µr′(t), . . .) (27)
and µr is as in (16). Y
(n)(t) is thus the collection of the empirical measures associated to
each market, which provides aggregate information on the share distributions at time t.
The following result identifies the generator of Y (n)(·), for which we need some additional
notation. Let
n[k] = n(n− 1) · · · (n− k+ 1), n[0] = 1. (28)
For every sequence (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ I
m, m ∈N, and given r ∈ I, define kr =
∑m
j=1 1(rj = r)
to be the number of elements in (r1, . . . , rm) equal to r. Define also µ
(kr)
r and µ(m) to be
the probability measures
µ(kr)r =
1
n[kr ]
∑
1≤ir,1 6=···6=ir,kr≤n
δ(xr
ir,1
,...,xr
ir,kr
), (29)
µ(m) =
∏
r∈I
µ(kr)r , (30)
and let
φm(µ) =
∫
f dµ(m), f ∈B(Xm). (31)
Finally, denote σrk(·) = σ(x
r
k) and
rk,i = (rk, ri), (32)
with ri as in (25), and define the map Φki :B(X
n)→B(Xn−1) by
Φkif(x1, . . . , xn) = f(x1, . . . , xi−1, xk, xi+1, . . . , xn). (33)
Proposition 4.2. Let Y (n)(·) be as in (27). Then, for φm(µ) as in (31), m≤Dn and
under the hypothesis and notation of Proposition 4.1, the generator of Y (n)(·) is
ADnφm(µ) =
∑
r∈I
{
θπ
m∑
i=1
Cn,r,i
∫
Mnrif dµ
(m)
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+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′
m(r, r′)
m∑
i=1
Cn,r,i
∫
Gn,r
′
ri
f dµ(m)
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤m
Cn,r,i
∫
(Φrk,if − f) dµ
(m) (34)
+
1
n
m∑
i=1
kr∑
k 6=i
Cn,r,i
∫
σrk(·)(Φrk,if − f) dµ
(m)
+
n− kr
n
m∑
i=1
Cn,r,i
∫
σm+1(·)(Φm+1,rif − f) dµ
(m+1)
}
.
The interpretation of (34) is similar to that of (26), except that (34) operates on the
product space P(X)#I instead of the product space of particles. Let Pn(X) ⊂P(X)
be the set of purely atomic probability measures on X with atom masses proportional
to n−1, DP(X)#I([0,∞)) be the space of right-continuous functions with left limits from
[0,∞) to P(X)#I and CP(X)#I ([0,∞)) the corresponding subset of continuous functions.
The following theorem, which is the main result of the section, shows that the measure-
valued system of Proposition 4.2 converges in distribution to a collection of interacting
Fleming–Viot processes. These generalize the celebrated class of Fleming–Viot diffusions,
which take values in the space of probability measures, to a system of dependent diffusion
processes. See Appendix A for a brief review of the essential features. Here convergence
in distribution means weak convergence of the sequence of distributions induced for each
n by Y (n)(·) (as in Proposition 4.2) onto the space DP(X)#I([0,∞)), to that induced
on the same space by a system of interacting Fleming–Viot diffusions, with the limiting
measure concentrated on CP(X)#I ([0,∞)).
Theorem 4.3. Let Y (n)(·) = {Y (n)(t), t≥ 0} be as in Proposition 4.2 with initial distri-
bution Qn ∈ (P
n(X))#I , and let Y (·) = {Y (t), t≥ 0} be a system of interacting Fleming–
Viot processes with initial distribution Q ∈ (P(X))#I and generator defined in Ap-
pendix A by (38)–(39). Assume X = [0,1], a(·, ·) ≡ m(·, ·) and M∗(x,dy) = ν0(dy). If
additionally σ in (39) is univariate, λn =O(n
2#I) and Qn⇒Q, then
Y (n)(·)⇒ Y (·) as n→∞
in the sense of convergence in distribution in CP(X)#I ([0,∞)).
5. Algorithms and simulation study
In this section we device suitable simulation schemes for the above constructed systems
by means of Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques. This allows us to explore different
economic scenarios and perform sensitivity analysis on the effects of the model parameters
on the regime changes. Remark 3.1 points out that the discrete representation for a single
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market can be obtained by means of Gibbs sampling the joint distribution qn,i in (3).
A similar statement holds for the particle system in a multi market framework. The
particle system in Section 3 is such that after a market r and an item xri are chosen with
probability ̺r and γ
r
n,i respectively, a new value for x
r
i is sampled from
q
Dn,i
(dxri |I(−x
r
i ))∝ βn(x
r
i )αI(−r) (dx
r
i ) +
n∑
k 6=i
βn(x
r
k)δxrk(dx
r
i ),
which selects the next ownership of the vacant share, and all other items are left un-
changed. It is clear that q
Dn,i
is the full conditional distribution of xri given the current
state of the system. Since the markets, and the particles within the markets, are updated
in random order, it follows immediately that the particle system is reversible, hence
stationary, with respect to (11).
Algorithm 1 is the random scan Gibbs sampler which generates a sample path of the
particle system with the desired number of markets. Here we restrict to the case of σ ≡ 0,
which implies that the normalizing constant q¯
Dn,i
is θ+ n− 1.
Algorithm 1
Initialize; then:
1. select a market r with probability ̺r;
2. within r, select xri with probability γ
r
n,i;
3. sample u∼Unif(0,1);
4. update xri :
a. if u < piθ
θ+n−1 , sample x
r
i ∼ ν0;
b. if u > θ
θ+n−1 , sample uniformly an x
r
k, k 6= i, within market r and set x
r
i = x
r
k;
c. else:
i. select a market r′ with probability m(r, r′);
ii. sample uniformly an xr
′
j within market r
′ and set xri = x
r′
j ;
5. go back to 1.
Remark 5.1. Note that the fact that updating the whole vector implies sampling from
n different distributions does not lead to an increase in computational costs if one wants
to simulate from the model. Indeed, acceleration methods such as those illustrated in [25]
can be easily applied to the present framework.
As previously mentioned, setting σ ≡ 0, hence β ≡ 1, as in Algorithm 1, does not lead
to neutrality among firms, determining instead a competitive advantage of the largest
(in terms of shares) on the smallest. A different choice for β allows us to correct or
change arbitrarily this feature. For example, choosing β(xrj∗ , µr) = n
−1
j , where nj is the
absolute frequency associated with cluster xrj∗ , yields actual neutrality. Observe also that
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sampling from (18), which is composed of three additive terms, is equivalent to sampling
either from
βn(x
r
i , µr)ν0(dx
r
i )∫
βn(y,µr)ν0(dy)
(35)
with probability
θπ
q¯
Dn,i
∫
βn(y,µr)ν0(dy),
from ∑
r′∈Im(r, r
′)
∑n
j=1 βn(x
r′
j , µr)δxr′
j
(dxri )∑
r′∈Im(r, r
′)
∑n
j=1 βn(x
r′
j , µr)
(36)
with probability
θ(1− π)
q¯
Dn,i
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′)
1
n
n∑
j=1
βn(x
r′
j , µr)
or from ∑n
k 6=i βn(x
r
k, µr)δxrk(dx
r
i )∑n
k 6=i βn(x
r
k, µr)
(37)
with probability
1
q¯
Dn,i
n∑
k 6=i
βn(x
r
k, µr),
where the normalizing constant q¯
Dn,i
is given by
θπ
∫
βn(x)ν0(dx) + θ(1− π)
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′)
∫
βn(x)µr′(dx) +
n∑
k 6=i
βn(x
r
k).
Once the functional forms for β and m are chosen, computing q¯
Dn,i
is quite straightfor-
ward. If, for example, X= [0,1], and the type of an individual admits also interpretation
as index of relative advantage, then one can set β(x) = x, and q¯
Dn,i
becomes
θπν¯0 + θ(1− π)
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′)x¯r
′
+
n∑
k 6=i
xrk,
where ν¯0 is the mean of ν0, and x¯
r′ is the average of the components of market r′. To this
end, note also that the assumption of ν0 being non-atomic can be relaxed simplifying the
computation. Algorithm 2 is the extended algorithm for βn 6≡ 1.
In the following we illustrate how the above algorithms produce different scenarios
where economic regime transitions are caused or affected by the choice of parameters,
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Algorithm 2
Initialize; then:
1. select a market r with probability ̺r;
2. within r, select xri with probability γ
r
n,i;
3. sample u∼Unif(0,1);
4. update xri :
a. if u < q¯−1
Dn,i
πθ
∫
βn(y,µr)ν0(dy), sample x
r
i from (35);
b. if u > 1− q¯−1
Dn,i
∑n
k 6=i βn(x
r
k, µr), sample x
r
i from (37);
c. else sample xri from (36);
5. go back to 1.
which can be structural or imposed by the policy maker during the observation period.
We first consider a single market and then two interacting markets, and for simplicity
we confine to the use of Algorithm 1. As a common setting to all examples we take
X = [0,1], n = 500, ν0 to be the probability distribution corresponding to a Beta(a, b)
random variable, with a, b > 0, with the state space discretized into 15 equally spaced
intervals. The number of iterations is 5×105, of which about 150 are retained at increasing
distance. Every figure below shows the time evolution of the empirical measure of the
market, which describes the concentration of market shares, where time is in log scale.
Figure 1 shows a single market which is in an initial state of balanced competition
among firms, which have similar sizes and market shares: this can be seen by the flat
Figure 1. High sunk costs progressively transform a perfectly competitive market into an
oligopoly and then into a monopoly.
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Figure 2. An Oligopoly becomes a competitive market after the policy maker reforms the sector
regulation (threshold 1), and concentrates again after the reform is abolished (threshold 2).
side closest to the reader. As time passes, though, the high level of sunk costs, deter-
mined by setting a low θ, is such that exits from the market are not compensated by
the entrance of new firms, and a progressive concentration occurs. The competitive mar-
ket first becomes an oligopoly, shared by no more than three or four competitors, and
eventually a monopoly. Here ν0 corresponds to a Beta(1,1) and θ = 1. The fact that
the figure shows the market attaining monopoly and staying there for a time greater
than zero could be interpreted as conflicting with the diffusive nature of the process
with positive (although small) entrance rate of new firms (mutation rate in population
genetics terms). In this respect it is to be kept in mind, as already mentioned, that
the figure is based on observations farther and farther apart in time. So the picture
does not rule out the possibility of having small temporary deviations from the seem-
ing fixation at monopoly, which, however, do not alter the long-run overall qualitative
behavior.
In Figure 2 we observe a different type of transition. We initially have an oligopolis-
tic market with three actors. The structural features of the market are such that the
configuration is initially stable, until the policy maker, in correspondence to the first
black solid line, introduces some new regulation which abates sunk costs or barriers to
entry. Note that in the single market case the parameter θ can represent both, since
this corresponds to setting π = 1 in (15), while in a multiple market framework we can
distinguish the two effects by means of the joint use of θ and π. Here all parameters are
as in Figure 1, except θ, which is set equal to 1 up to iteration 200, equal to 100 up to
iteration 4.5× 104 and then equal to 0. The concentration level progressively decreases
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and the oligopoly becomes a competitive market with multiple actors. In correspondence
of the second threshold, namely the second black solid line, there is a second regulation
change in the opposite direction. The market concentrates again, and, from this point
onward, we observe a dynamic similar to Figure 1 (recall that time is in log scale, so
graphics are compressed toward the farthest side). The two thresholds can represent, for
example, the effects of government alternation when opposite parties have very different
political views about a certain sector.
We now proceed to illustrate some effects of the interaction between two markets with
different structural properties and regulations when some of these parameters change.
Figure 3 shows three scenarios regarding a monopolistic (left) and a competitive market
(right). In all three cases ν0 corresponds to a Beta(1,1) for both markets. Case 1 repre-
sents independent markets, due to very high technological conversion costs or barriers to
entry, which is for comparison purposes. Here θa = 0, θb = 100 and πb = 1. In Case 2 the
monopolistic market has low barriers to entry, while (2b) is still closed, and a transition
from monopoly to competition occurs. Here θa = 30, θb = 100, πa = 0.01, πb = 1. Case 3
shows the opposite setting, that is, a natural monopoly and a competitive market with
low barriers to entry. The monopolist enters market (3b) and quickly assumes a dominant
position. Here θa = 0, θb = 100, πb = 0.7. Recall, in this respect, the implicit effect due to
setting β ≡ 1, commented upon above.
Case (2a) in Figure 3 suggests another point. The construction of the particle system
by means of the hierarchical models defined in Section 2 compels us to have the same
centering measure ν0, which generates new firms for all markets. In particular, this makes
it essentially impossible to establish, by mere inspection of Figure 3(2a), whether the
transition is due to new firms or to entrances from (2b). Relaxing this assumption on ν0
partially invalidates the underlying framework above, in particular, due to the fact that
one loses the symmetry implied by Lemma 2.1. Nonetheless the validity of the particle
system is untouched, in that the conditional distributions of type (14) are still available,
where now ν0,r, in place of a common ν0, is indexed by r ∈ I. This enables us to appreciate
the difference between the two above mentioned effects. If one is willing to give a specific
meaning to the location of the point x ∈ X which labels the firm, then ν0,r 6= ν0,r′ can
model the fact that, say, in two different sectors, firms are polarized on opposite sides of X,
which, in turn, represents some measurement of a certain exogenous feature possessed by
those firms. Consider a monopoly and a competitive market, where we now take ν0,a and
ν0,b to be the probability measures corresponding to a Beta(2,4) and a Beta(4,2) random
variable for the monopolistic and competitive market, respectively. We are assuming that
firms on the left half of the state space have a certain degree of difference, with respect to
those on the other side, in terms of a certain characteristic. Figure 4 shows the different
impact of barriers to entry and sunk costs on the monopolistic market, due to the joint
use of π and θ, thus splitting Figure 3(2a) into two different scenarios. The competitive
market is composed by firms which are polarized toward the right half of the state space,
meaning, for example, that they have a high level of a certain feature. Then case 1 of
Figure 4 shows the monopoly when sunk costs are high, but barriers to entry are low,
so that the concentration is lowered by entrance of firms from the other market, rather
than from the creation of new firms from within; while case 2 shows the effects of high
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Figure 3. Effects of parameters’ change in interacting monopolistic and competitive markets.
(1a) and (1b) are both closed, hence independent, markets. (2b) is closed, but (2a) has low
barriers to entry (pi ≈ 0), and firms from (2b) progressively lower the concentration in (2a).
(3b) has low barriers to entry, so that the monopolist of (3a) enters the market and conquers a
dominant position.
barriers to entry and low sunk costs, so that a transition to a competitive regime occurs
independently of (2b). The parameters for case 1 are θa = 30, θb = 100, πa = 0, πb = 1,
while for case 2 we have θa = 30, θb = 100, πa = 1, πb = 1.
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Figure 4. Firms in the competitive market (right) are polarized towards the right half of the
state space. (1a) is a monopoly with high sunk costs and low barriers to entry, so firms from
(1b) enters market (1a). (2a) is a monopoly with high barriers to entry and low sunk costs, so
that a transition to a competitive regime occurs independently of (2b).
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose a model for market share dynamics which is both well founded,
from a theoretical point of view, and easy to implement, from a practical point of view. In
illustrating its features we focus on the impact of changes in market characteristics on the
behaviors of individual firms taking a macroeconomic perspective. An enrichment of the
model could be achieved by incorporating exogenous information via sets of covariates.
This can be done, for example, by suitably adapting the approach recently undertaken
in [34] to the present framework. Alternatively, and from an economic viewpoint, more
interestingly, one could modify the model adding a microeconomic understructure: this
would consist of modeling explicitly the individual behavior by appropriately specifying
the function βn at Point (d) in Section 3, which can account for any desired behav-
ioral pattern of a single firm depending endogenously on both the status of all other
firms and the market characteristics. This additional layer would provide a completely
explicit micro-foundation of the model, allowing us to study the effect of richer types
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of heterogeneous individual decisions on industry and macroeconomic dynamics through
comparative statics and dynamic sensitivity analysis. These issues of more economic
flavor will be the focus of a forthcoming work.
Appendix A: Background material
Basic elements on the Gibbs sampler
The Gibbs sampler is a special case of the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm, which, in turn,
belongs to the class of Markov chain Monte Carlo procedures; see, for example, [18]. These
are often applied to solve integration and optimization problems in large dimensional
spaces. Suppose the integral of f :X→Rd with respect to π ∈P(X) is to be evaluated,
and Monte Carlo integration turns out to be unfeasible. Markov chain Monte Carlo
methods provide a way of constructing a stationary Markov chain with π as the invariant
measure. One can then run the chain, discard the first, say, N iterations, and regard
the successive output from the chain as approximate correlated samples from π, which
are then used to approximate
∫
f dπ. The construction of a Gibbs sampler is as follows.
Consider a law π = π(dx1, . . . ,dxn) defined on (X
n,X n), and assume that the conditional
distributions
π(dxi|x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)
are available for every 1≤ i≤ n. Then, given an initial set of values (x01, . . . , x
0
n), update
iteratively
x11 ∼ π(dx1|x
0
2, . . . , x
0
n),
x12 ∼ π(dx2|x
1
1, x
0
3, . . . , x
0
n),
...
x1n ∼ π(dxn|x
1
1, . . . , x
1
n−1),
x21 ∼ π(dx1|x
1
2, . . . , x
1
n),
and so on. Under mild conditions, this routine produces a Markov chain with equilib-
rium law π(dx1, . . . ,dxn). The above updating rule is known as a deterministic scan. If
instead the components are updated in a random order, called random scan, one also
gets reversibility with respect to π.
Basic elements on Fleming–Viot processes
Fleming–Viot processes, introduced in [17], constitute, together with Dawson–Watanabe
superprocesses, one of the two most studied classes of probability-measure-valued diffu-
sions, that is, diffusion processes which take values on the space of probability measures.
A review can be found in [15].
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A Fleming–Viot process can be seen as a generalization of the neutral diffusion model.
This describes the evolution of a vector z = (zi)i∈S representing the relative frequencies
of individual types in an infinite population, where each type is identified by a point in
a space S. The process takes values on the simplex
∆S =
{
(zi)i∈S ∈ [0,1]
S: zi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈S
zi = 1
}
and is characterized by the infinitesimal operator
L=
1
2
∑
i,j∈S
zi(δij − zj)
∂2
∂zi ∂zj
+
∑
i∈S
bi(z)
∂
∂zi
,
defined, for example, on the set C(S) of continuous functions on S, if S is compact. Here
the first term drives the random genetic drift, which is the diffusive part of the process,
and bi(z) determines the drift component, with
bi(z) =
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
qjizj −
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
qijzi + zi
(∑
j∈S
σijzj −
∑
k,l∈S
σklzkzl
)
,
where qij is the intensity of a mutation from type i to type j and σij = σji is the selection
term in a diploid model. This specification is valid for S finite, which yields the classi-
cal Wright–Fisher diffusion, or countably infinite; see, for example, [13]. Fleming and
Viot [17] generalized to the case of an uncountable type space S by characterizing the
corresponding process, which takes values in the space P(S) of Borel probability mea-
sures on S, endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Its generator on functions
φm(µ) = F (〈f1, µ〉, . . . , 〈fm, µ〉) = F (〈f , µ〉), where F ∈C
2(Rm), f1, . . . , fm continuous on
S and vanishing at infinity, for m≥ 1, and 〈f,µ〉=
∫
f dµ, can be written
Lφ(µ) =
1
2
m∑
i,j=1
(〈fifj , µ〉 − 〈fi, µ〉〈fj , µ〉)Fzizj (〈f , µ〉)
+
m∑
i=1
〈Mfi, µ〉Fzi(〈f , µ〉) +
m∑
i=1
(〈(fi ◦ π)σ,µ
2〉 − 〈fi, µ〉〈σ,µ
2〉)Fzi(〈f , µ〉),
where µ2 denotes product measure, π is the projection onto the first coordinate,M is the
generator of a Markov process on S, known as the mutation operator, σ is a non-negative,
bounded, symmetric, Borel measurable functions on S2, called selection intensity function
and Fzi is the derivative of F with respect to its ith argument. Recombination can also
be included in the model.
Interacting Fleming–Viot processes
Introduced by [40], and further investigated by [7] and [6], a system of interacting
Fleming–Viot processes extends a Fleming–Viot process to a collection of dependent
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diffusions of Fleming–Viot type, whose interaction is modeled as migration of individu-
als between subdivided populations. Following [6], the model without recombination can
be described as follows. Let the type space be the interval [0,1]. Each component of the
system is an element of the set P([0,1]), denoted µr and indexed by a countable set I
of elements r, r′, . . . . For F : (P([0,1]))I →R of the form
F (µ) =
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
f(x1, . . . , xm)µr1(dx1) · · ·µrm(dxm) (38)
with f ∈ C([0,1]m), (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ (I)
m, m ∈ N, the generator of a countable system of
interacting Fleming–Viot processes is
GF (µ) =
∑
r∈ΩN
{
q
∫
[0,1]
[∫
[0,1]
∂F (µ)
∂µr
(y)M∗(x,dy)−
∂F (µ)
∂µr
(x)
]
µr(dx)
+ c
∑
r′∈ΩN
a(r, r′)
∫
[0,1]
(µr′ − µr)(dx)
∂F (µ)
∂µr
(x)
(39)
+ d
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
∂2F (µ)
∂µr ∂µr
(x, y)Qµr (dx,dy)
+ s
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
∂F (µ)
∂µr
(x)σ(y, z)µr(dy)Qµr (dx,dz)
}
,
where the termQµr (dx,dy) = µr(dx)δx(dy)−µr(dx)µr(dy) drives genetic drift,M
∗(x,dy)
is a transition density on [0,1]×B([0,1]) modeling mutation, B([0,1]) is the Borel sigma
algebra on [0,1], a(·, ·) on I×I such that a(r, r′) ∈ [0,1] and
∑
r a(r, r
′) = 1 is a transition
kernel modeling migration and σ(·, ·) is a bounded symmetric selection intensity function
on [0,1]2. The non-negative reals q, c, d, s represent, respectively, the rate of mutation,
immigration, resampling and selection. Let the mutation operator be
Mf(z) =
∫
[f(y)− f(z)]M∗(x,dy), f ∈B(X) (40)
and the migration operator be
Gr
′
f(z) =
∫
[f(y)− f(z)]µr′(dy), f ∈B(X), (41)
for r′ ∈ I. Using this notation, and when F is as in (38), (39) can be written
GF (µ) =
∑
r∈ΩN
{
q
m∑
i=1
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
Mrif dµr1 · · · dµrm
+ c
∑
r′∈ΩN
a(r, r′)
m∑
i=1
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
Gr
′
ri
f dµr1 · · · dµrm
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+ d
m∑
i=1
m∑
k 6=i
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
(Φrk,if − f) dµr1 · · · dµrm (42)
+ s
m∑
i=1
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
(σri,m+1(·, ·)f
− σm+1,m+2(·, ·)f) dµr1 · · · dµrm dµr dµr
}
,
where Mj and G
r′
j are M and G
r′ applied to the jth coordinate of f , ri is as in Propo-
sition 4.1, rk,i as in (32) and Φhj as in (33). When I is single-valued, (42) simplifies
to
GF (µ) = q
m∑
i=1
〈Mif,µ
m〉+ d
m∑
i=1
m∑
k 6=i
〈Φkif − f,µ
m〉
+ s
m∑
i=1
(〈σi,m+1(·, ·)f,µ
m+1〉 − 〈σm+1,m+2(·, ·)f,µ
m+2〉),
which is the generator of a Fleming–Viot process with selection with F (µ) = 〈f,µm〉,
f ∈C([0,1]).
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The infinitesimal generator of the Xn-valued process de-
scribed at the beginning of Section 3 can be written, for any f ∈B(Xn), as
Anf(x) = λn
n∑
i=1
γn,i
∫
[f(ηi(x|y))− f(x)]qn,i(dy|x(−i)), (43)
where qn,i(dy|x(−i)) is (4) and ηi is as in (22). Within the multi-market framework, (43)
is the generator of the process for the configuration of market r, say, conditionally on all
markets r′ ∈ I, r′ 6= r, and can be written
ADnf(x
r|I(−r)) = λn
n∑
i=1
γrn,i
∫
[f(ηi(x
r |y))− f(xr)]q
Dn,i
(dy|I(−xri )), (44)
where I(−r) and I(−xri ) are as in (12) and (13), γ
r
n,i are the market-specific removal
probabilities and q
Dn,i
(dy|I(−xri )) is (14). Then the generator for the whole particle
system, for every f ∈B(XDn), is
ADnf(x) = λn
∑
r∈I
̺r
n∑
i=1
γrn,i
∫
[f(ηri(x|y))− f(x)]qDn,i(dy|I(−x
r
i )), (45)
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where ηri is as in (25). Setting now βn as in (20), (45) becomes
ADnf(x) =
∑
r∈I
{
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,i
∫
[f(ηri(x|y))− f(x)]
(
1+
2σ(y)
n
)
α
I(−r)
(dy)
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,i[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)] (46)
+
1
n
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,iσ(x
r
k)[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)]
}
,
with Cn,r,i as in (21). Substituting (15) in (46) yields
ADnf(x) =
∑
r∈I
{
θπ
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,i
∫
[f(ηri(x|y))− f(x)]
(
1 +
σ(y)
n
)
ν0(dy)
+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′
m(r, r′)
∑
1≤j 6=i≤n
Cn,r,i
∫
[f(ηri(x|y))− f(x)]
×
(
1 +
σ(y)
n
)
µr′(dy) (47)
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,i[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)]
+
1
n
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,iσ(x
r
k)[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)]
}
.
By means of (23) and (24), with Mni f and G
n,r′
i f denoting, respectively, M
n and Gn,r
′
,
applied to the ith coordinate of f , and Mnrif and G
n,r′
ri
f interpreted according to (25),
(47) can be written
ADnf(x) =
∑
r∈I
{
θπ
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,iM
n
ri
f(x)
+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′
m(r, r′)
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,iG
n,r′
ri
f(x)
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,i[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)]
+
1
n
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,iσ(x
r
k)[f(ηri(x|x
r
k))− f(x)]
}
.

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Proof of Proposition 4.2. For k ≤ n, let n[k] be as in (28), and define the probability
measure
µ(Dk) =
∏
r∈I
1
n[k]
∑
1≤ir,1 6=···6=ir,k≤n
δ(xrir,1 ,...,x
r
ir,k
), (48)
where Dk is as in (10). Define also
φDk(µ) = 〈f,µ
(Dk)〉, f ∈B(XDk)
and
ADnφDk(µ) = 〈ADnf,µ
(Dk)〉, (49)
where 〈f,µ〉=
∫
f dµ. Then ADnφDn(µ) is the generator of the (P(X))
#I -valued system
(27), which from (26), letting f ∈B(XDn) in (49), can be written
ADnφDn(µ) =
∑
r∈I
[
θπ
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,i〈M
n
ri
f,µ(Dn)〉
+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′
m(r, r′)
n∑
i=1
Cn,r,i〈G
n,r′
ri
f,µ(Dn)〉
(50)
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,i〈Φrk,if − f,µ
(Dn)〉
+
1
n
∑
1≤k 6=i≤n
Cn,r,i〈σrk(·)(Φrk,if − f), µ
(Dn)〉
]
,
where σrk(·) denotes σ(x
r
k) and Φki is as in (33). Note now that for f ∈B(X
m), m≤Dn,
we have
Mnrif = f, G
n,r′
ri
f = f, Φrk,if = f, if i >m
and
〈Φrk,if,µ
(m)〉= 〈f,µ(m)〉, i≤m,m+ 1≤ k ≤ n.
Given (29) and (30), it follows that when f ∈B(Xm), m≤Dn, (50) can be written
ADnφm(µ) =
∑
r∈I
{
θπ
m∑
i=1
Cn,r,i〈M
n
ri
f,µ(m)〉
+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′
a(r, r′)
m∑
i=1
Cn,r,i〈G
n,r′
ri
f,µ(m)〉
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤m
Cn,r,i〈Φrk,if − f,µ
(m)〉
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+
1
n
m∑
i=1
kr∑
k 6=i
Cn,r,i〈σrk(·)(Φrk,if − f), µ
(m)〉
+
n− kr
n
m∑
i=1
Cn,r,i〈σm+1(·)(Φm+1,rif − f), µ
(m)µr〉
}
.

Proof of Theorem 4.3. For f ∈B(Xk), k ≥ 1, let ‖f‖= supx∈Xk |f(x)|. Observe that
(23) and (24) converge uniformly, respectively to (40) and (41), as n tends to infinity,
implying
‖〈Mnrif,µ
(m)〉 − 〈Mrif,µ
(m)〉‖ → 0 , f ∈B(Xm),
‖〈Gn,r
′
ri
f,µ(m)〉 − 〈Gr
′
ri
f,µ(m)〉‖ → 0 , f ∈B(Xm).
Here the supremum norm is intended with respect to the vector x ∈Xm of atoms in µ(m),
with µ(m) as in (30). Let now µ
(kr)
r be as in (29), so that µr = n
−1
∑n
i=1 δxri . Then it is
easy to check that
‖〈f,µ(kr)r 〉 − 〈f,µ
kr
r 〉‖→ 0, f ∈B(X
kr ),
as n→∞, where µkr denotes a kr-fold product measure µr × · · · × µr , and that
‖〈f,µ(m)〉 − 〈f,µ×m〉‖ → 0, f ∈B(Xm),
as n→∞, where we have denoted
µ×m =
∏
r∈I
µkrr .
We also have, from (21) Cn,r,i = λn̺rγ
r
n,i/q¯Dn,i , where λn is the Poisson rate driving the
holding times, ̺r =O(#I
−1) and γrn,i =O(n
−1) are the probability of choosing market
r and xri respectively during the update, and q¯Dn,i =O(n) is the normalizing constant of
(18). Then choosing λn =O(nDn) = O(n
2#I) implies Cn,r,i→ 1 as n→∞. Finally, let
ϕm ∈B(P(X
m)) be
ϕm(µ) = 〈f,µ
×m〉=
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
f(x1, . . . , xm)µr1(dx1) · · ·µrm(dxm) (51)
for any sequence (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ I
m. Then it can be checked that (34) converges, as n
tends to infinity, to
Aϕm(µ) =
∑
r∈I
[
θπ
m∑
i=1
〈Mrif,µ
×m〉+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′)
m∑
i=1
〈Gr
′
ri
f,µ×m〉
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤m
〈Φrk,if − f,µ
×m〉+
m∑
i=1
〈σri(·)f − σm+1(·)f,µ
×mµr〉
]
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which, in turn, implies
‖ADnφm(µ)−Aϕm(µ)‖ −→ 0 as n→∞.
Using (51), and letting X= [0,1], Aϕm(µ) can be written
Aϕm(µ) =
∑
r∈I
[
θπ
m∑
i=1
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
Mrif dµr1 · · · dµrm
+ θ(1− π)
∑
r′∈I
m(r, r′)
m∑
i=1
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
Gr
′
ri
f dµr1 · · · dµrm
(52)
+
∑
1≤k 6=i≤m
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
(Φrk,if − f) dµr1 · · · dµrm
+
m∑
i=1
∫
[0,1]
· · ·
∫
[0,1]
(σri(·)f − σm+1(·)f) dµr1 · · · dµrm dµr
]
,
which equals (42) for appropriate values of q, c, d, s and for univariate σ. The statement
with CP(X)#I ([0,∞)) replaced by DP(X)#I([0,∞)) now follows from Theorems 1.6.1
and 4.2.11 of [14], which, respectively, imply the strong convergence of the corresponding
semigroups and the weak convergence of the law of Y (n)(·) to that of Y (·). Replacing
DP(X)#I([0,∞)) with CP(X)#I ([0,∞)) follows from [1], Section 18, by relativization of
the Skorohod topology to CP(X)#I ([0,∞)). 
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